I. Introduction
As a significant body of scholarship has convincingly demonstrated, conceptions of history and public representations of collective identity were closely entangled phenomena in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) from its very foundation. 1 The notion of an independent East German nation, concepts of socialist statehood and ideas about citizenship were negotiated with reference to historical narratives that were based on often mythical conceptions of the past.
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The GDR's politics of history (Geschichtspolitik) involved a constant reworking of these myths according to their perceived utility for the creation of political legitimacy. 3 The particularities of this process * I would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers and the editors for their very insightful comments and suggestions that helped to improve this piece. Furthermore, I would like to express my gratitude to Dr Daniel Laqua (Northumbria University) for his helpful advice and comments. Against this backdrop, observers reacted with astonishment when, in the late 1970s, Prussia re-emerged as a key historical reference point for the GDR.
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Contemporaries in the West characterized this phenomenon as a veritable 'Prussia Renaissance' (Preußenrenaissance), which had started around 1979. Although the equation of the GDR with Prussia was not entirely new in western discourse, it now became a commonplace to refer to it as the 'Red Prussia'. the significance of this shift and interpreted it as a move towards more conservative notions of national history and identity. 12 Yet, they have primarily discussed the involvement of academic historians in creating and disseminating the new image of the Prussian past. 13 In contrast, the promotion of this new ideological course through the mass media and the responses by the East German population remain understudied.
This article critically examines the Preußenrenaissance whilst demonstrating how this shift was negotiated within the SED and intellectual circles. In addition, it explores an underestimated aspect of this 'Prussian turn' in GDR historiography, namely its entanglement with similar developments in West Germany. Indeed, the re-emergence of Prussianism in the GDR of the 1980s cannot be solely understood as a top-down process:
it was a complex phenomenon in which many self-willed actors became involved. A consideration of the productions of the East German state television Fernsehen der DDR (GDR TV) and their viewers' reactions sheds light on this chequered process. As a whole, an examination of the discourse about Prussia reveals the inner dynamics and contradictions of the GDR's politics of history during the last decade or so of the regime's existence.
II. Economic stagnation, political crisis and the rise of tradition and heritage as contexts for the Preußenrenaissance
The re-emergence of Prussia as a part of the GDR's official conception of history was connected to broader changes in the official politics of collective identity during the 1970s. Conventionally, this has been associated with a new discourse on tradition and heritage (Tradition und Erbe). 14 Within this 'tradition and heritage' paradigm, the GDR emphasized its role as the custodian of the entire heritage of the German people, having already claimed many of its progressive traditions. 15 The adaption of Tradition und Erbe ostensibly allowed the integration of large parts of German national history, which had hitherto been seen as reactionary, into the concept of East German socialist identity. 16 However, maintaining a notion of distinct working-class traditions also facilitated an image of the past in which the GDR remained a 'workers' and peasants' state', rooted in the history of class struggle. This also implied an increased emphasis on aspects of these developments triggered a significant loss of utopian ideals (Utopieverlust) amongst broad swathes of the East German population, causing a crisis of legitimacy for the SED.
19 By the end of the 1970s, the old hegemonic narratives of social progress and socialism that had dominated the earlier period of stability appeared to contradict the obvious social reality of many East Germans. Furthermore, from 1980-1 onwards, the escalating political tensions in Poland created anxieties amongst the ruling elites about the possibility of similar developments in the GDR. 20 It was therefore no coincidence that, in the face of stagnation and eventual crisis, a different official version of collective identity came to the fore. Germanness and nationalism now became dominant features of the popular representation of the official collective identity of the GDR.
Within this context, the reference to Prussia had two major dimensions: on the one hand, the GDR was in most parts situated on the former core territories of the Prussian state, and it was thus possible to integrate aspects of Prussian history into the now spatially defined identity of the GDR. 21 On the other hand, the symbolic integration of Prussia into the historical canon underpinned a growing emphasis on discipline, stability and loyalty in the GDR propaganda of the 1980s. This development was illustrated by the newly found appreciation for Prussia's efficient bureaucracy and the stereotypical 'Prussian virtues'. important to be left to the Springer press and the SED. One does not need to be right-wing in the sense of being authoritarian to respect the Prussian virtues, or even more, to feel bound to them.' 37 Shortly later, a similar line of argument would also be used by the SED to justify its ideological volte-face towards Prussia. The discourse about Prussian history, which ensued in the wake of the 'Prussia a shared common history and nationhood, others were more critical. 43 . The church newspaper Sonntagsblatt for example asked whether the re-emergence of Prussianism in the GDR was a mere coincidence at a time when the state was increasingly embarrassed by its citizens' calls for more freedom. It also posed the question whether references to the Prussian virtues of obedience and subordination were attempts to silence these demands. 44 Another Christian newspaper was convinced that the East's reappraisal of Prussian virtues was nothing less than an attempt to justify austerity in a period of economic crisis. 45 The attacks of these Christian newspapers were certainly influenced by the growing tensions between oppositional church groups and the GDR since the mid-
1970s
. 46 Yet, these comments were largely representative of the critical views of the developments in the GDR in the West. The openness with which Hammel criticized the SED's new take on Prussian history is remarkable. Strikingly, there were apparently no serious attempts to curb him.
On the contrary, the fact that GDR TV broadcasted the play suggests a certain level of sympathy among the responsible officials. As media and cultural life were more or less tightly controlled by the party, the broadcast highlights the ambiguous and at times These circumstances help explain why both the promotion and criticism of the new historical identity were mainly the product of individual initiatives rather than a centrally steered project.
The cases that have been described thus far mostly involved intellectuals and officials. In order to reconstruct popular reactions and to assess the success and failure of the Preußenrenaissance as a legitimizing strategy, it is necessary to broaden the scope of the enquiry. For this purpose, an analysis of the representations of Prussia in television and film and the reactions of the viewers offers important insights.
IV. Televising the new image: media representations of Prussia and their reception
Before 1978, Prussia as a subject was barely covered by the East German television. Until this point, merely six productions dedicated to Prussia had been aired on GDR TV. In the military context, references to Prussian traditions helped to reinforce notions of an allegedly historic brotherhood-in-arms with the Russians. They were also used to distinguish the NVA from the West German Bundeswehr, emphasizing the former's rootedness in national history.
Although Prussian history was selectively adapted to substantiate ideological statements, the subject did not attract significant attention before the end of the 1970s. In 1980, however, the interest in the project led to a second chance for Börner. In order to invalidate the objections, an expert opinion by the Leipzig-based historian Karl Czok was commissioned by the head dramaturge of the production Erika Emuth. Czok's assessment of the script was extraordinarily positive. 84 Additionally, producers and the responsible editors at GDR TV submitted upbeat projections of viewer numbers and anticipated public perceptions of the series. 85 This intervention finally led to the 
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The positive reception of the Prussia-centred parts of the series led to the production of the earlier parts, focusing on Saxon history under August the Strong and his mistress, the Countess Cosel. These two parts, however, could only be produced with help of the licence fees paid by the West German state public television ARD. Though attempts were made to cut costs wherever possible, the production of the last two parts amounted to 9.7 million DDR Marks, costing nearly as much as the first four films (11.8 million DDR Marks) combined. 91 Besides the TV-specific considerations that led to the production of these parts, the production also sought to counter-balance the emphasis on Prussian history. This exemplary statement suggests that some viewers were aware of the profound turns in the GDR's politics of history. These changes were seemingly not as comprehensible and consistent as those responsible might have hoped for. Moreover, it is unclear whether Prussia was indeed accepted as a specific historical tradition of the GDR, or whether it rather appealed to a sense of German unity and thus ran counter to the party's intentions.
While the self-contradictory character reduced the appeal of the new identity policy, it did not necessarily diminish the popularity of the films. By and large, the viewers' letters suggest that many people were able to enjoy the opulent productions without buying into the more or less subliminal ideological messages.
V. Conclusion
The re-emergence of Prussian history in the GDR of the 1980s has to be interpreted in the light the SED's changing policies on identity and legitimacy. unanimously supported within the rank-and-file of the ruling Socialist Unity Party. In fact, the Preußenrenaissance in the late GDR proved to be a chequered and often contradictory process which was shaped by the many self-willed actors. The article
